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The limited Role of Electoral Game Rules: the Austrian 
Party System in “Post-Rokkanian” Settings*
Vít Hloušek
Abstract: The article deals with the potential impact of the electoral system on the 
party system. The general discussion, based on Duverger’s and Sartori’s electoral rules, 
concludes with an assessment of the  Austrian case. Austrian party system development 
is examined with regard to the evolution of the country’s proportional representation 
electoral system. The author tries to ﬁnd more relevant explanations for the changes
within the Austrian party system’s logic of functioning other than the electoral system, 
such as the de-alignment of voters and the changing structure of cleavages. In order to 
show another factor shaping the Austrian party system arrangement, the author tries 
to discuss not only recent development since the mid 1980s, but he also evaluates the 
Austrian First Republic and the period from 1945 to 1986 . The article concludes with 
the argument that Duverger’s and Sartori’s electoral rules could be useful in discussing 
party system format but they have very little to say when party system mechanics is 
concerned.
Keywords: Austria; electoral system; party system; Duverger’s and Sartori’s 
electoral rules
Introduction
Austria was traditionally seen as one of the best examples conﬁrming the classical
theory of Stein Rokkan’s cleavages, and a model of the emergence of mass political 
parties and a competitive pluralist party system. On the other hand, it was rather 
overlooked by scholars focusing on electoral systems in order to ﬁnd “laws” that
describe and analyse electoral systems’ effects on the format and mechanics of party 
systems. The reason was obvious. Austria embodied an excellent example of pillarized 
polity (cf. Lijphart 1969; Lijphart 1977) divided into two main camps (Lager)5, Social 
Democratic and Catholic-conservative, which competed with the smaller National-
-Liberal (or Third) camp, which had a less complex structure. The electoral system 
was rooted in the principle of proportional representation (PR) and enabled two large 
parties – the Socialist (Social Democratic since 1991) Party of Austria (SPÖ) and the 
Austrian People’s Party (ÖVP) – to maintain control over “their” electoral bases. The 
ÖVP represented rural, religious, and employers’ interests more, while the SPÖ was 
a party defending urban, secular, and employees’ interests (cf. Deschouwer 2002: 
* The paper was produced as part of the Ministry of Education, Youth and Physical Education research 
project Political Parties and the Interest Representation in Contemporary European Democracies (Code 
No. MSM0021622407).
5 Austrian historian Lothar Höbelt says that: “Austrian politics were tribal” (Höbelt 2003: 6).
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200-207). For a long time Austrian parties were able to encourage a high level of for-
mal political participation (partisan membership) and election turnout (cf. Caramani 
2004: 68). As Caramani (2004: 144-146) pointed out, Austria was one of the most 
nationalized systems in Western Europe, meaning that electoral behaviour measured 
according to electoral outcomes in different constituencies became more and more 
homogenous. This situation continued at least until the 1980s, although there were 
certain signs of a radical change as early as the 1960s.
We can observe the processes of Austria’s shift from consociation to a competitive 
version of democracy from the mid-1980s (cf. Luther 1992; Luther, Müller 1992; 
Ulram 1990, and Plasser, Ulram 2002)6; these processes were symbolically completed 
by the 1999 election and the subsequent formation of an ideologically coherent and 
minimal-winning coalition of the right and the centre-right. This is connected with 
the transformation of the traditional Austrian two-party system from the 1940s to the 
1970s, ﬁrst to a temporary version of the two-and-a-half party system at the turn of the
1970s, and then to the format of limited pluralism after 1986, that opened the way to 
formation of the moderate pluralism type in Sartori’s model (cf. Müller 2000: 5-9). 
This  article attempts to discuss the limited impact of the electoral system on the 
party system. A theoretical discussion based on Sartori’s concept of mutual relations 
of both the electoral and party systems will be tested using the example of Austria, 
a speciﬁc Central European country with experience of more than 50 years of unbroken
democratic development. This example enables us to go beyond analysing only recent 
developments, and provide an evaluation more focused on development and rooted in 
history. The author is  not disagreeing with Sartori’s concept of electoral “laws”, but 
he wants to discuss its relative importance vis-à-vis other aspects that form the shape 
and patterns of party competition and party systems generally.
Duverger’s electoral “laws” or Sartori’s electoral rules?
A systematic effort to examine relations between electoral and party systems could 
be traced back at least to the famous “laws” ﬁrst discussed by Maurice Duverger in
1951. He formulated two hypotheses: 1) PR and a two-ballot majority7 system opens 
the way to multipartism; 2) a plurality rule creating and maintaining a two-party sys-
tem. Duverger devoted great attention to the tendency of PR to maintain: “virtually 
without change the party system existing at the time of its adoption” (attributed to 
Duverger 1986: 71; for theoretical discussion concerning Duverger’s “laws” cf. Far-
rell 2001: 153-174; Shugart 2005: 29-36). Let us discuss brieﬂy these ﬁndings in the
Austrian context. The “magic” ability to maintain the existing party system could not 
be easily conﬁrmed if we take the Austrian case into consideration. Austria adopted
6 Even though the Austrian public’s willingness to accept the competitive/conﬂict models of politicians‘
behaviour rather than the consensual approach is at least disputable (Plasser, Ulram 2002: 147-150)
7 Duverger later somehow reﬁned the tendency produced by a two-ballot majority, postulating that multi-
partism resulting from a two-ballot majority will be “tempered” by alliances.
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the PR formula in 1919, and this meant at the same time that it took a decisive step 
towards modern mass politics, crossing over the third threshold of democracy, the 
threshold of representation (cf. Rokkan 1999: 244-260). Nevertheless, the beginning 
of the PR period went hand in hand with a complex reconstruction of the Austrian 
party system, which started after the introduction of male universal suffrage in 1907. 
To put it clearly, the Christian Socialists succeeded in attempting to become part of the 
establishment as early as the pre-First World War era (the election of 1907 and 1911 
were held according to the ﬁrst past the post system) thanks to cooperation with the
conservative Catholic representation of the aristocracy and ofﬁcials of the Catholic
Church. However, the strongest party measured according to electoral support was 
the Social Democratic Workers’ Party (SDAP). The introduction of the PR formula 
was the means which opened the way for the Social democrats to play the role of a 
major opposition party and to transform popular support into parliamentary seats after 
1919. On the contrary, many élite parties declined with the introduction of the PR 
formula. The clearest indication of this is the example of small parties of the “Third 
Camp” (National-Liberal Camp) that almost lost all importance and that were forced to 
unify under the label of the Pan-German People’s Party (GDVP) in 1919. The electoral 
system kept its PR form after 1945, but it only allowed the continuing predominance 
of the two major parties until the late 1960s.
Duverger later examined cases such as Germany or Austria, that showed a clear 
tendency towards the two-party system in spite of a PR formula (cf. Duverger 1986: 71-
76). Unfortunately, Duverger paid more attention to German (and Irish) cases and left 
the Austrian example almost untouched. He brieﬂy argued that the system of Austrian
Proporz was the reason why his “law” of PR systems did not work there (Duverger 
1986: 73, 75-76). Duverger’s argument that a similar two-party system would remain 
the same under the conditions of the plurality rule is theoretically correct, but it does 
not answer our basic questions concerning the relation between the electoral system 
and party system.
In order to defend and improve Duverger’s “laws” Sartori formulated more precise 
conditions in which different kinds of PR work. He put more emphasis on the size 
of a constituency than on mathematical translation formulas: put simply, the smaller 
the districts the lower the proportionality (Sartori 1986: 53). He also pointed out that 
most of the real PR systems are impure, and some of them could even be very non-re-
presentative due to the size of constituency, electoral threshold, and/or mathematical 
translation formula (Sartori 1986: 54). Another important change outlined by Sartori 
was the consideration of the level of structural consolidation of the entire party system 
(cf. Sartori 1976; Sartori 1997). Sartori’s arguments are important for our case study 
because Austria is seen as an important example combining two-party mechanics with 
PR, thus it embodied (until the mid-1980s) exceptions which hindered the formulation 
of electoral “laws” (Sartori 1986: 57). Sartori concludes the discussion by postulating 
that pure PR is a “no-effect” system and thus he is theoretically close to Duverger’s 
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comments devoted to the “virtually no change” impact of PR systems. Finally, Sartori 
formulated four rules (Sartori 1986: 58-59; reprinted in Sartori 2001: 93-94) improving 
Duverger’s “laws”. Only the fourth one mentions PR systems and it reads:
PR systems also obtain reductive effects – though to a less and less predictable 
extent – in proportion to their non-proportionality; and particular whenever they 
apply to small constituencies, establish a threshold of representation, or attribute 
a premium. Under these conditions PR, too, will eliminate the lesser parties whose 
electorate is dispersed throughout the constituencies; but even a highly impure PR will 
not eliminate the small parties that dispose of concentrated above-quota strongholds 
(Sartori 1986: 59).
This rule cannot be left aside without further discussion concerning its system 
conditions. Sartori presumed that impure PR formulas could turn a two-party system 
into a system of moderate pluralism, but only under the condition that politics/public 
opinion are not highly polarized. Pure, or almost pure PR could lead even to a system 
of extreme pluralism and thus to the “mechanics” of moderate or polarized pluralism. 
It is, however, important to judge whether both party as well as electoral systems are 
weak or strong. Sartori correctly presented Austria until the beginning of the 1980s as 
an example of a strong party system and weak electoral system, concluding that the 
party system is blocking the potential multiplication effects of Austrian PR (Sartori 
1986: 60-63).
It seems at ﬁrst sight that Sartori’s rules ﬁt quite well the reality of Proporz in 
Austria as well as the reality of changing patterns of inter-party competition since 
1966. We will see that two well-structured major parties (ÖVP and SPÖ) maintained 
a comfortable parliamentary majority without huge problems. Another clear observa-
tion shows that the small but virulent forces of the Third Camp were able to survive 
as a relevant political minority in Parliament, and their potential to form coalitions 
was constantly uncertain and changing. Still,  two problems remain that should be 
discussed later: 1) the Austrian party system was a two-party format but hardly ever 
two-party “mechanics”; 2) how could we explain the changes that occurred in Austrian 
party system after 1986?
Austrian party system changes – in format and in the logic  
of functioning
If we compare the structure of party competition before 1933 and after 1945, we 
can observe signiﬁcant changes from the model of polarized pluralism to moderate
pluralism patterns of competition. Polarization was even aggravated by the antagonis-
tic position of both main parties represented in all four of Rokkan’s cleavages before 
the Second World War. While the Christian Socialist Party (predecessor of the ÖVP) 
represented the interests of rural areas, landowners, peripheral areas, and the Catholic 
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Church, the Social Democratic Workers’ Party (predecessor of the SPÖ) was strictly 
secular, protected the interests of urban industrial workers, and held its position ﬁrmly
in “Red Vienna” and several other industrial centres, while its support in the country 
was marginal. The cleavages were thus not weakened by their crossing, but on the 
contrary, they reinforced each other. All the relevant parties operated within this envi-
ronment of strong competition (cf. Jelavich 2003: 151-191; Rumpler 1990).
The experiences of failed pre-war democracy led Austrian political leaders to more 
convergent behaviour after 1945. The speciﬁc mechanism of cooperation between two
strongest camps (Lager) was created thanks to the willingness of the Austrian People’s 
Party and Socialist Party of Austria to cooperate. This arrangement is called Proporti-
onal Democracy (Proporzdemokratie)8 (cf. Engelmann 1962; Mommsen-Reindl 1976: 
27-101; Plasser, Ulram, Grausgruber 1992:16-19; Secher 1958:794-798).
Both parties of the large coalition had a relatively similar and in the European 
context high and stable electoral support (cf. Bartolini 2000: 109-121). The signiﬁ-
cant electoral failure of the SPÖ in 1949 (38.7 per cent compared to 44.6 per cent 
in 1945) is explained mainly by the entry of the League of Independents (Freedom 
Party of Austria since 1956) to the electoral market (Gerlich 1987: 76). The year 1953 
however saw a return to “normality” since the SPÖ won the election with 42.1 per 
cent. The electoral results of both main parties were basically equal (slightly better for 
the ÖVP) in the 1950s and 1960s, ﬂuctuating above 40 per cent. The main reason for
such electoral stability was that the structure of society remained almost untouched 
(cf. Table 1).
Table 1: Changes in Sector Employment in Austria 1910-1980
Data in % 1910 1934 1951 1961 1969 1977 1980
Primary sector 39.4 37.1 32.6 23.0 19.1 11.8 10.0
Secondary sector 31.1 32.2 37.8 41.5 40.8 41.0 46.6
Tertiary sector 29.5 30.7 29.6 35.5 40.1 47.2 42.4
Source: Bodzenta (1980: 164).
8 We can brieﬂy describe the principle of the Proporzdemokratie in terms of the slow but ﬁrm translation
of the mechanism of proportional representation of both large parties from the level of functioning 
coalition governments, to lower levels of political (and non-political as well) life. The roots of this 
principle could be traced back to the ﬁrst coalition government after 1945. Key decisions were made by
agreements provided in the cooperation of both parties’ administrations after Austrian Communist Party 
(KPÖ) left the government in 1947 (The Austrian Communists have not been signiﬁcant in parliament
since 1959). Administrative functions were distributed according to the principle of balance between 
these two parties at regional and municipal levels. This, of course, made membership in one of the two 
decisive parties more attractive, at least since the mid-1950s, when even functions in the governing bo-
dies of state-owned or controlled enterprises (airlines, banking sector) started to be distributed according 
to the Proporz principle. Moreover, public administration ofﬁces, elementary school head teacher posts
etc were distributed according to the same principle.
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The Austrian party system thus became relatively stable at the end of the 1940s and 
remained this way until the 1960s. If we, however, consider the number of relevant 
parties and the distribution of their support, we can talk about an even longer continu-
ity. When observing the strength of the parties and their potential to form coalitions 
or be in opposition, we can see that the Austrian party system in fact oscillated around 
a two-party system until 1983 (cf. Gerlich 1987: 64-66). The SPÖ represented one of 
the two main poles in this system. However, although the ÖVP was the more active 
and stronger party until the mid-1960s, i.e. until the period identical with the classical 
era of the Austrian consociation mechanism, the SPÖ took the initiative from the end 
of the 1960s, and its one-party governments actually partly changed the mechanisms 
of Austrian politics. New phenomena, such as increasing voter volatility, emerged.
Table 2: Constant voters and volatile voters in parliamentary election, 1983-2002
1979-
1983
1983-
1986
1986-
1990
1990-
1994
1994-
1995
1995-
1999
1999-
2002
Voters who changed party preference  7  13  14  16  12  14  20
New mobilized voters, not voted before  3  1  2  6  7  1  7
Demobilized voters who became abstainers  2  3  7  10  3  8  4
Sum of volatile voters  12  17  23  31  22  24  30
Stable non-participators at the election  6  7  9  14  16  17  18
Stable party supporters  82  76  68  55  62  59  53
Sum of stable voters  88  83  77  69  78  76  71
Sum of eligible voters 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Source: Ogris et al (2002: 6)
There were certain shifts from the strictly consociation behaviour of both of the 
large Austrian political parties towards more competitive models of political behaviour 
in the 1970s. In spite of this, the ÖVP in this decade was still a very loyal opposition 
in the European context, which was due to the persistence of consociation periods in 
other spheres of political and social life (see for instance the mechanisms of social 
dialogue). During the ﬁrst half of the 1980s, however, the adversarial behaviour of
both large parties towards each other increased (cf. Gerlich 1987: 67-69). The reason 
was not only the establishment of new parties (the Green Party), but also shifts in the 
Austrian electorate that will be considered below. 
The situation after the 1983 election showed new and until then unexpected 
problems of the Austrian party system: not only did new possibilities of forming go-
vernment coalitions occur (SPÖ-FPÖ; SPÖ-ÖVP; ÖVP-FPÖ), but they were actually 
discussed. The winning combination from these negotiations was a government of the 
SPÖ and the Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ). The SPÖ initiated talks with the ÖVP to 
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demonstrate its willingness to govern consensually; the ÖVP-FPÖ talks were held de 
facto for the two parties to improve their bargaining positions vis-à-vis the Socialists 
(Müller 2003: 97).
Using the terms of Stein Rokkan and S. M. Lipset, the Austrian party system ﬁnally
loosened in the 1986 election (Lipset, Rokkan 1967: 50-56; cf. Bartolini, Mair 2000: 
55-67) and the conditions for this slackening had existed since the end of the 1970s.9 
The Austrian party system changed dramatically, and new political parties emerged 
(The Green Party; cf. Dachs 1997); traditional “catch-all” parties of the large coalition 
lost their support; on the contrary, the FPÖ protest party attracted new voters. The 
powerful internal dynamics within the Austrian party system has been proved by the 
FPÖ and the Greens to a smaller degree or the Liberal Forum temporarily (1995-99). 
On the other side, the SPÖ and the ÖVP have been on the defensive during the whole 
period. Both the two-party system as well as the two-and-half party system patterns 
disappeared, and too much space remained for discussion of whether expansion of new 
parties (and thus emergence of a limited pluralism format) will be followed by change 
towards moderate or polarized pluralism.
Recent developments have left only a few clues to solve the issue of the search 
for new patterns of Austrian party system dynamics. We can observe the processes of 
fragmentation of ex-Third-Camp parties. After the remarkable rise of popular support 
for Jörg Haider’s FPÖ from the beginning of the 1990s, which culminated in an im-
pressive electoral outcome in 1999, enabling the FPÖ to enter a coalition government 
with the ÖVP, the process of a swift and sharp decline of the FPÖ can be seen, starting 
with the combination of external crisis (lack of means of mobilization after entering 
government) and internal disputes leading to Haider’s new project, the “orange” Union 
for the Austrian Future (BZÖ), which tried to attract protest voters left after the 2000 
and 2002 election and who were under-represented by Schüssel’s coalitions (cf. Höbelt 
2003). The emergence and decline of the Liberal Forum in the 1990s (cf. Liegl 1997) 
is more of a historical phenomenon now, but it should be remembered that for several 
years the Austrian party system retained a ﬁve-party format.
Another problem that has to be solved is the question of stabilization of inter-party 
relations, and both patterns of competition and cooperation. Schüssel’s coalition for-
mula will hardly survive the next election, and there is no clear wisdom that says who 
and with whom will form the coalition after this year’s election. The coalition potential 
of the FPÖ declined rapidly, while the Greens also showed a remarkable increase in 
their fortunes. The main cards will, however, stay in the hands of two major parties, 
but the possibility of a quick and trouble-free rush back to a large coalition model is 
more illusion than a probable outcome of the post-election negotiations. I do not rule 
9 These election were crucial even from the point of view of the total change in voter behaviour trends. 
While in 1979 the total volatility was only 1.3 per cent (which complied with the standard from the 
beginning of the 50s), it was 6.1 per cent in 1986, and 9.9 per cent in 1990 (Plasser, Ulram, Grausgruber 
1992: 30).
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out the possibility of a large coalition, but the way towards this solution would be 
very complicated. The Austrian party system underwent important steps towards the 
system of moderate pluralism in 1986, but we still have to wait for more predictable 
coalition/opposition formulas enabling us to judge the type of party system more 
precisely.
But let us go back to Austrian large catch-all parties – the ÖVP and SPÖ. Both 
of the traditional large parties had to cope with the haemorrhage of the traditional 
voters and have been forced to face appeals for redeﬁnition of some of their ideo-
logical and programme basis. (Kitschelt 1994; for general discussion devoted to 
decline of catch-all mechanisms cf. Puhle 2002). Both parties, however, have a better 
position compared to the mid-1990s. The reform of the economic policy of the FPÖ, 
connected with implementation of tax reform limiting the generous Austrian welfare 
state, brought workers back to the fold of the Social Democrats. The evaluation of 
the ÖVP governmental performance is also favourable, and the Chairman, Wolfgang 
Schüssel, is seen as a trustworthy and competent politician and compared to Gusen-
bauer, the SPÖ chairman, seems to be in many aspects a charismatic person. These 
parties thus remained the main axis of the Austrian party system in the 2002 election 
and will decide (probably not in mutual agreement) about the form of a government 
coalition.
The Austrian electoral system – more a sign of continuity than  
an example of a ﬂuid system
The genesis of the Austrian electoral system started at the beginning of the 1860s. 
More than four decades had passed until limited suffrage became universal for men, 
introduced in 1905-07. The single member plurality electoral system remained howe-
ver with the situation changing dramatically after the decline of the Habsburg Empire 
after the First World War. The Austrian First Republic adopted a PR electoral system 
which helped to maintain social segmentation and to translate it into the composition 
of Parliament. The PR principle is enshrined in the Austrian constitution (Article 26) 
and its use in practice has remained relatively consistent since 1945. Nevertheless, 
there were several changes to the Austrian electoral system. Important reforms occur-
red in 1971 and 1992, but it could be said that the Austrian electoral system created 
and creates only small or even negligible distortions (Müller 2003: 91; Müller 2005: 
397). The proposal to introduce a personalized PR system as in Germany was rejected 
due to the unwillingness of both the ÖVP and SPÖ to apply it. The idea of switching 
to a simple majority vote system met the same fate (Müller 2005: 412-414; Pelinka 
1999: 504).
The 1971 reform was provoked by the feeling in politics that electoral law favoured 
ÖVP voters and it was consequently disadvantageous for both the SPÖ and FPÖ due 
to the arrangement of electoral districts. The former 25 districts were replaced by nine 
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new and larger units. The new system was, however, criticized for not allowing perso-
nal contact between candidates and voters and for giving all power to political parties 
in the process of distribution of candidates on the electoral list. Discussions held in the 
1970s and 1980s lead to the latest reform in 1992. Forty smaller districts, with around 
180,000 eligible voters, were created in order to enable personal contact between 
candidates and voters. Preferential voting within a party list system was introduced 
too (cf. Fischer 1997: 101-102; Müller 2005: 399-400).
The Austrian Parliament – National Assembly (Nationalrat) – is composed of 183 
members, and Austria is divided into 43 electoral districts. Candidates are nominated 
via party lists. Voters could change the ordering of candidate using preferential voting 
at district and regional levels. There is a per cent threshold at state level, which qualiﬁes
parties eligible for the distribution of seats in Parliament. Nevertheless, there is another 
possibility for the party to take part in national level seat distribution if the party wins 
a seat in the ﬁrst tier in any of the 43 districts. The threshold is combined with three-tier
districts at electoral unit, regional, and national levels using the Hare method (for the 
ﬁrst and the second tiers) and d’Hondt method (for the third tier) systems (cf. Müller
2005: 401-405).
How pure is the Austrian PR system? The format of Austrian PR awards seats in 
such a way that the outcome is de facto proportional in terms of the total number of 
votes (cf. Gallagher, Mitchell 2005: 17). The Austrian electoral system ranks among 
the most proportional systems according to Farrell (2001: 157-159; cf. Müller 2005: 
407-408): the Gallagher index of disproportion was only 1.8 (the mean for the 1994-
2002 period compared with 3.38 in Germany or 5.20 in the Czech Republic) at the end 
of the 1990s; the effective number of parties index was 3.54 at the same time, which 
corresponds more or less with the four main parties represented in Parliament.
Searching for an alternative explanation: changes in society  
and political behaviour; restructuring cleavages of Austrian politics
The break-up of the camp milieu that started in the 1970s brought about the in-
dividualization of voter behaviour, a rapid increase in the degree of voter volatility 
(cf. Plasser, Ulram 2000; Müller 2000: 9-13; Müller, Plasser, Ulram 2004; Plasser, 
Ulram 2002), a decrease in the effectiveness of traditional socio-political networks 
built around both large parties; and the phenomenon of disgust with politics increased 
(Politikverdrossenheit; cf. Ulram 1990: 170-180, 215-220; Pelinka, Rosenberger 
174-176; Müller, Plasser, Ulram 2004: 149-154; Plasser, Ulram 2002: 108-115). All 
these processes also introduced a new dynamic in Austrian party competition. Both 
large parties had to adapt from camp-oriented parties to “catch-all” forms of parties 
focused primarily on electoral competition. However, the party membership of the 
SPÖ and ÖVP remains relatively high in the Western European context (cf. Pelinka, 
Rosenberger 2003: 152-153).
The limited Role of Electoral Game Rules: the Austrian Party System  
in “Post-Rokkanian” Settings
 
Vít Hloušek
33
Politics in Central Europe 2 (June 2006) 1
Table 3: Development in the number of members of SPÖ, ÖVP and FPÖ
SPÖ ÖVP (estimate) FPÖ
1970 719,389 1974 539,000 1970 32,800
1975 693,156 1977 546,000 1975 33,000
1980 719,881 1980 554,000 1980 37,380
1985 685,588 1986 555,000 1985 37,057
1990 597,426 1990 555,000 1990 40,629
Source: Nick, Pelinka (1993: 73)
Until the 1980s the electoral behaviour of Austrian society had been very stable, 
determined by a camp mentality and still characterized by electoral models from the 
time of a fully stratiﬁed society.10 The most turbulent period was the second half of 
the 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s, when Austrian electoral behaviour was 
dominated by processes of segmentation, individualization and de-alignment of 
socio-political relations (cf. Plasser 1988; Plasser, Ulram, Grausgruber 1992: 20-23; 
Plasser, Ulram 2002: 83-100) that increased electoral mobility in an unprecedented 
manner (Ulram 1990: 288-289). While in 1970 the percentage of voters that strongly 
identiﬁed themselves with their party and were its core members constituted 65 per
cent of all voters, this was only 39 per cent in 1986, and only 28 per cent in 1995 (Pe-
linka, Rosenberger 2003: 177). This de-segmentation was mainly of beneﬁt to those
parties that were not so connected with the traditional environment of strong mass 
political groupings (FPÖ and Greens). The SPÖ’s fall was partly caused by the change 
in the role of trade unions in the economy, while the ÖVP suffered mainly through the 
process of secularization in among Austrian voters. Both parties, moreover, were not 
very attractive to the new post-material oriented section of the electorate, in particular 
the younger generation. On the other hand, older people still vote mainly for the ÖVP 
and the SPÖ. However, the process of breaking identiﬁcation relations of voter-party
slowed down considerably at the beginning of the current decade, and some authors 
(Plasser, Ulram 2002: 92) talk about a certain re-stabilization.
Table 4: Aggregated differences in the electoral behaviour of age cohorts 1986-99
Superiority (+) or fall (-) of the SPÖ and the ÖVP compared to the FPÖ with the LIF 
and the Greens
Age cohort 1986 1990 1994 1995 1999 SPÖ and ÖVP 1986-1999
18-29 +44 +18  ±0  -4 -10 -54
30-44 +60 +44 +14 +22 +14 -46
15-59 +80 +60 +34 +44 +37 -43
60 and above +78 +80 +48 +56 +47 -31
Source: Müller (2000: 21).
10 Among the Western European countries, Austria was a state with the lowest average total volatility in the 
period from 1918 to 1985 (Bartolini, Mair 1990: 74, and 323-324).
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Besides the break-up of the camp mentality, the Austrian electoral market was also 
liberalized by the process of privatization of many state enterprises in the 1980s and re-
duction of the welfare state, which began in the 1990s and progressed during Schüssel’s 
ﬁrst coalition government of the ÖVP and FPÖ in 2000-02 (Pelinka, Rosenberger 2003: 
62-63). Furthermore, new issues emerged that the voters cared about.11 Another example 
of declining of traditional means of Lager control over the electorate was the breakdown 
of traditional partisan dailies (as for example SPÖ-based Arbeiter Zeitung) and at the 
same time the emergence of new printed media such as Der Standard at the end of the 
1980s and at the beginning of the 1990s. More competition in the sphere of electronic 
media (broadcasting) has opened since then as well (Larkey 1999: 213-215).
Neither of the two large Austrian parties was prepared for these changes at the end 
of the 1980s. According to Peter Ulram, the following was still true at the beginning 
of the 1990s: 
1. The party structures were not able to react to the desegmentation and decline in 
camp mentality and failed to open communication for representing the demands of 
new voters and voter group;
2. the party decision processes handled new issues only with great difﬁculty, the
political style of both large parties was to a considerable degree uncoordinated, 
unsystematic, aggressive, and full of traditional resentments,
3. a large group of the members of both parties at the high and medium level still lived 
in the mental environment of the traditional conception of politics, which differen-
tiated them not only from the population but also for instance from the economic 
and cultural élite, which lead to a rapid decline in the ability of the “political class” 
to mobilize voters (Ulram 1990: 289-290).
Besides the behaviour of Austrian citizens, we can ﬁnd another reason for the
re-structuring of Austrian party system’s patterns of functioning. We have already 
observed the remarkable rigidity of cleavages which have had loosened in the years 
just after the Second World War and the mid-1960s. The cleavages structure has loo-
sened since the end of the 1960s and, moreover, they started to be less society-based 
and became more political (for this distinction cf. Römmele 199912). What does the 
cleavage structure in Austria look like today?
11 According to Wolfgang C. Müller, such issues were unemployment, the shock from the slump in some 
sectors of Austrian economy after joining the EU, environmental problems, and immigration (Müller 
2000: 22-23; cf. Plasser, Ulram 2002: 151-163).
12 A similar, although not the same, distinction was suggested by Mattei Dogan (2002), who distinguished 
vertical cleavages dividing society according to cultural criteria, and horizontal cleavages that divide 
society according to socio-economic stratiﬁcation. He attempted to devise a matrix of West European
countries according to relative strength of both horizontal and vertical cleavages, suggesting that Austria 
is, together with Germany and Belgium, an example of country with strong vertical cleavages and strong 
horizontal cleavages also (Dogan 2002: 98). Dogan’s concept should be, however, more precise in the 
deﬁnition of the relationship between vertical and horizontal cleavages on the one hand and the traditi-
onal Rokkan’s functional and territorial dimension on the other hand because it seems that his model of 
vertical cleavages combines both of these dimensions in a certain but unfortunately unclear way.
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A certain role is still played by the traditional cleavage between owners and workers, 
which was somewhat transformed into a looser socio-economic cleavage dividing right 
and left, to a smaller degree between church and state, to an even smaller degree than 
between city and the country, while the traditional Austrian character of the cleavage 
between centre and periphery that came about in relation to Germany’s loss of its 
former strength. Austrian society is currently characterized by relatively strong post 
material issues and the related post-material cleavages, both in the movement towards 
environmental models, which played into the hands of the Greens (entered Parliament 
in 1986), and in the sense of supporting the “new” politics (“new” right and “new”, in 
Austria mainly the socially liberal, “left”), which was of beneﬁt in the second half of the
1990s mainly to the FPÖ and (temporarily) the Liberal Forum (cf. Ulram 1990: 81-87; 
Müller 2000: 41-43; Plasser, Ulram 2002: 163-169). We can currently talk about the 
partial unlocking of social relations determined by cleavages and the transformation 
of Rokkan-type cleavages into less strict political divides (see Table 5). The socio-
-economic cleavage dominates (cf. Hloušek, Kopeček 2005: 4-5) combining economic 
and societal issues. It is cut across by an Inglehart-like post-material cleavage which 
combines axiological and environmental factors.
Table 5: Structure of main cleavages in the current Austrian party system
P
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l 
cl
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Socio-economic cleavage
material oriented
Left Right
KPÖ
SPÖ ÖVP FPÖ
BZÖ
LIF
Greens
Post-material oriented
Conclusion – limited impact of electoral rules on a party system’s 
logic of functioning in “Post-Rokkanian” world
The Austrian electoral system belongs to those which are “feeble”  according to 
Sartori, and its relevance for party system formation is thus limited. The only real 
consequence of the 1992 electoral system was the failure of the Liberal Forum to enter 
Parliament in 1999. This small centrist party, which seceded from the FPÖ in 1993, 
would have entered Parliament according to the 1971 system. A certain psychological 
effect of the 4 per cent threshold worked also though the negotiation of two former 
Green List members, which led to the reinforcement of the Green Party by the members 
of a concurrence “environmental” project in 1993 (Müller 2005: 406-407).
The Austrian case shows that more appropriate than electoral “laws” or rules is 
a healthy scepticism related to the ability of electoral rules to decisively shape the 
logic of party systems. We could agree with German political scientist Dieter Nohlen 
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(Nohlen 1990: 272-279), who criticized Duverger’s and Sartori’s concepts for certain 
empirical, theoretical, and methodological reasons and who pointed out the limited 
explanatory capacity of both “laws” and rules. The problem with Sartori’s electoral 
rules is that they could be related successfully only to the format of a party system. 
Regrettably, they have only little to say when we need to discuss impacts on the me-
chanics of party systems.
If we apply Sartori’s fourth rule to the Austrian party system we can conclude that 
relatively pure Austrian PR has only a slight reductive effect on the Austrian party sys-
tem format. The only “victim” of the Austrian electoral system is Liberal Forum, which 
declined in 1999 when it only narrowly fell below the nationwide electoral threshold. 
It is, of course, disputable whether the electoral system caused the decline of the Li-
berals. It seems to be more plausible explanation that the effects of Austrian PR only 
fostered tendencies provoked by other stimuli. Put another way, Austrian PR enabled 
newly emerging (or newly reinforcing) parties – the Greens and the FPÖ – to enter 
Parliament relatively quickly, thus allowing the expansion of the Austrian party system 
format from two (and-a-half) parties to three and four (potentially even ﬁve) parties.
But how can we explain the changes in a party system’s logic of functioning? Sartori 
is able to answer clearly because he presupposes the almost causal relation between 
a format and a type. A four (or ﬁve) party format – limited pluralism – thus leads almost
inevitably to the type of moderate pluralism (cf. Sartori 1976: 119-130, 282-293). But 
the answer is not so clear in the Austrian case. The Austrian party system responded 
somehow belatedly to changes in Austrian society. The decline of traditional cleavages 
and the camp mentality, the emergence and reinforcement of new cleavages and other 
related processes such as “medialisation” of Austrian politics created a less stable 
environment. Political parties have to ﬁnd new ways of attracting more fragmented
and more ﬂuid groups of voters in the “Post-Rokkanian” world characterized by the
existence of cartel-like parties operating in an environment of only weak alignments. 
The analysis of the electoral system is thus only one and a relatively small part of in-
quiry into the nature and behaviour of political parties in a party system. The Austrian 
case could be used as a ﬁne example supporting such a conclusion.
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